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Abstract 
Economic reforms of the late 1980s have contributed to rapid economic growth in China. While the 
overall standard of living has improved, economic growth has also resulted in an increase in income inequality. 
Rising income inequality can increase social tensions that can impede further economic growth. By making use 
of firm level panel data, this paper focuses on the impact of increased market competition and trade 
liberalisation on skilled-unskilled wage gap in China. A theoretical model is used to argue that trade 
liberalisation and market competition can affect skilled-unskilled wage gap. Based on this result, an econometric 
model is specified. The empirical analysis presented in this paper shows that increased trade liberalisation has 
contributed to an increase in skilled-unskilled wage gap in China. However, increased market competition has 
the opposite effect. 
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1. Introduction 
The current period of openness and global integration has witnessed rapid economic 
growth accompanied by massive inflow of foreign investment in China.1 The structure of the 
Chinese economy has significantly changed – the contribution of the private sector to GDP is 
now more than 70%. It is widely believed that economic reforms have reduced the overall 
level of poverty in China and the standard of living of millions of Chinese workers has also 
improved.2 However, economic growth has resulted in rising income inequality. Income 
inequality in China can be viewed from a number of perspectives – inequality in different 
regions (e.g., coastal versus inland areas or eastern versus western provinces), urban-rural 
wage gap, skilled-unskilled wage gap, etc.3 
This paper focuses on skilled-unskilled wage gap in China’s manufacturing sector. 
Specifically, we consider the role of trade liberalisation and increased market competition. A 
number of existing studies have attempted to identify various determinants of skilled-
unskilled wage gap. However, none of the existing studies have empirically examined the 
impact of these factors on skilled-unskilled wage gap in China’s manufacturing sector. 
The empirical analysis, which is the main contribution of this paper, is based on a 
theoretical model. The theoretical model, which is based on existing studies, shows that trade 
liberalisation and market competition can affect the skilled-unskilled wage gap. Based on the 
theoretical model, an econometric model is specified. The econometric model is estimated by 
making use of a dataset that covers a large number of Chinese firms in 2000, 2003 and 2006.  
                                                 
1 Starting from 1949, the Chinese economic history can be divided into six periods: (1) Revolution and Land 
Reforms period of 1949-56, (2) the Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine of 1957-61, (3) post Famine 
Recovery period of 1962-65, (4) Cultural Revolution and transition to reform period of 1966-78, (5) rural 
reform period of 1979-84, and (6) Openness and Global Integration period that started in 1985. 
 
2 The per-capita income of China increased from US$1,740 in 2006 to US$3,556 in 2009. 
 
3 For example, Fleisher et al.  (2010) consider the impact of FDI and investment in human capital on regional 
income inequality in China. They conclude that investment in human capital in less-developed areas can reduce 
regional income inequality. Ramasamy and Yeung (2010) suggest that FDI through increase in productivity 
has contributed to increase in wages in China - the coastal areas due to better quality infrastructure and the 
availability of better trained workers have witnessed a large increase in wages. The coastal areas account for a 
major proportion of the GDP. The Pearl River delta, located on the southeast coast, is believed to be home to 
some of China’s richest people. While the Eastern provinces are experiencing strong growth, the central 
(excluding Hunan, Hubei and Jiangxi) and western provinces are lagging behind (see Ramstetter et al., 2009). 
Ma (2006) considers regional economic inequality in China arising from trade flows associated with foreign 
direct investment. 
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A number of recent theoretical and empirical studies have attempted to examine the 
impact of globalisation and trade liberalisation on wage inequality between the skilled and 
unskilled workers in developed as well as developing countries. By making use of a standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, Kremer and Maskin (2003) argue that trade liberalisation increases 
wage inequality in developed countries but its effect on wage inequality in developing 
countries is the opposite. Marjit and Kar (2005) show that, contrary to the general belief, 
emigration of both skilled and unskilled workers from a developing economy can increase 
wage inequality. Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2007) suggest that in the presence of labour 
market imperfections, a reduction in import tariff on low-skilled manufacturing sector can 
contribute to wage inequality. 
As far as empirical studies are concerned, Taylor and Driffield (2005) consider the 
link between wage inequality and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the UK. They argue that 
on the average approximately 11% of wage inequality in the UK can be attributed to FDI. 
Chung and Kin (2007) argue that the growing wage inequality in the US can be attributed 
to skill-biased technological change. Verhoogen (2008) argues that firms that are attempting 
to produce higher quality products tend to hire highly skilled workers. These workers are paid 
higher wages which can account for rising wage inequality. The empirical analysis presented 
in this paper is based on data from Mexico. Breau and Rigby (2010) consider the issue of 
skilled-unskilled wage inequality in Canada. They argue that import competition from low-
income countries has contributed to increased wage inequality in Canada. Bustos (2011) 
argues that trade liberalisation can induce productive firms to utilise skilled-biased 
technologies which has contributed to wage inequality in Brazil.4 
Studies that consider the determinants of skilled-unskilled wage gap in China include Wu 
(2001). By making use of a general equilibrium model involving imperfect competition, Wu 
argues that foreign investment in China’s differentiated sectors tends to increase the skilled-
unskilled wage gap. Wu further argues that increase in the wage gap will be smaller if China 
                                                 
4 Other important studies that consider the issue of wage inequality include Beyer, Rojas and Vergara (1999), 
Das (2002), Feenstra and Hanson (2003), Marjit, Beladi and Chakrabarty (2003), Das (2005), Chamarbagwala 
(2006), Long, Riezman and Soubeyran (2007), Yabuuchi and Chaudhuri (2007), Chaudhuri (2008), Gupta and 
Dutta (2010), Beladi and Chao (2010) and Chaudhri and Banerjee (2010). Some of these studies argue that 
globalisation has resulted in increased competition which along with trade liberalisation has contributed to rising 
wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. It is suggested that technological improvement and 
technology transfer arising from foreign investment in host countries is skill-biased and hence foreign 
investment and the associated spillovers boost productivity thereby increasing wages. As the skilled workers are 
relatively more productive, foreign investment is likely to increase the wage gap. 
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enforces stricter protection of intellectual property rights. However, Wu’s empirical work is 
not based on any rigorous statistical methods.  Zhao (2001) argues that foreign firms 
operating in China tend to pay higher wages to skilled workers as compared to the wages paid 
by local firms including the state owned enterprises. By making use of household survey data 
from 1988 and 1995, Knight and Song (2003) consider the impact of labour market reforms 
on urban wage inequality in China. By making use of panel data from 1986 to 2001, Owen 
and Yu (2003) argue that export oriented FDI has contributed to wage inequality in China.  Li 
(2008) suggests that proximity to large markets can account for wage inequality in China. Liu 
et al. (2010) utilise data on 2,884 Chinese firms over the period 1993-1996 to consider 
the effect of FDI on wages. They argue that the relationship is affected by the degree of skill 
intensity of FDI. By making use of a general equilibrium model, Mitchener and Yan (2010) 
examine the skilled-unskilled wage gap in China during the 20th century. They argue that 
during the early part of the 20th century, Chinese exports became more unskilled labour 
intensive and hence during the 1920s, the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled 
workers in China fell by approximate 8%. 
The empirical methodology used in this paper is not very different from the existing 
studies. For example, Taylor and Driffield (2005) use a cost function as a basis for their 
econometric model. The cost of production in their model depends on the wage rate, stock of 
capital, output and technology. Verhoogen (2008) used a general equilibrium model to 
establish a link between the variables of interest. Based on the equilibrium conditions, an 
econometric model is specified. As compared to the existing empirical studies, the theoretical 
framework presented in this paper is a little more general and factor market equilibrium 
conditions are also specified. The cost/profit conditions that are also used by other studies 
determine the output market equilibrium. Combing these conditions with factor market 
clearing conditions allows one to derive a general reduced form solution for the equilibrium 
wage gap, which is used as a basis for specification of an econometric model in this paper. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a theoretical model 
which is used to argue that trade liberalisation and market competition can affect skilled-
unskilled wage gap. Based on the theoretical framework, an econometric model is specified 
in Section 3. This section also contains data description. Empirical results are presented in 
Section 4 whereas Section 5 contains some concluding remarks. 
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2. Determinants of Skilled-Unskilled Wage Gap: A Theoretical Framework 
By making use of the existing theoretical literature, such as Anwar (2010) and Anwar 
and Rice (2009) , the purpose of this section is provide a theoretical foundation for the 
econometric model that will be estimated in section 3.5 Consider an economy that produces 
two traded goods (Z and Y). Z is an importable whereas Y is an exportable good. Z is 
produced by means of capital and unskilled labour, whereas Y is produced by means of 
capital, skilled labour and a large number of varieties of producer services. Examples of such 
services include consulting, auditing, engineering and legal services. These services are 
primarily utilised by sector Y and therefore they do not enter as input into the production of 
the imported good. A number of existing studies such as Redding and Venables (2004) have 
highlighted the role played by the services sector in real economies. Each variety of the non-
traded producer services is produced by means of capital and skilled labour. Following the 
existing studies, inter-sector differences in factor intensities are captured in an extreme 
manner, namely sector Y is skilled labour intensive whereas sector Z is unskilled labour 
intensive. The production functions are as follows: 
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where α, β, θ and δ are parameters in the range [0,1];  xi  is the output of the ith variety of 
producer services sector; n is the number of varieties produced by the services sector and L and 
K are labour and capital inputs used in the production of the final goods.  
The production of both final goods is subject to constant returns to scale. On the other 
hand, production of each variety of producer services is subject to internal economies of 
scale. Accordingly, each firm specialises in the production of a single variety. The cost 
function of the ith variety is as follows: 
   ( , , ) ( )s i s ic w r x r w xμ λ= +
where  and ws respectively are the price of capital and the skilled wage rate; λ is a 
positive constant and
r
μ  is the amount of capital used by each firm in the services sector. 
                                                 
5 We use a minimalist model to establish a link between (i) trade liberalisation and skilled-unskilled wage gap 
and (ii) market competition and skilled-unskilled wage gap. We do not claim that this model adequately captures 
all aspects of the Chinese economy. 
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The above specification implies that the fixed cost involves capital and the variable 
cost involves skilled labour. Similar cost function has been used by other studies such as 
Marrewijk, Sitobra, Vaal and Viaene (1997). It is well-known that the production function 
corresponding to the above cost function is non-homogenous. Following the existing 
literature, we consider a symmetric equilibrium so that this paper focuses on a symmetric 
equilibrium where the price elasticity of demand for each variety is fixed.  Varieties of 
producer services are produced under conditions of monopolistic competition. The following 
condition determines the equilibrium output of the exportable good industry, where p is the 
price of producer services and  ( ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )1 (1 )αα β α α βα β α β− −− − − − − −Θ = − − > 0.
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The right-hand side of equation (1) is the unit cost of production whereas the left-hand 
side is the price of the exportable good and all prices are measured in the units of the final 
good Y. An increase in the number of varieties decreases the effective price of producer 
services and hence average cost of the exportable good decreases.  If the services sector is 
active in equilibrium then the following first order condition must hold 
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Equation (2) is the usual profit maximisation condition which shows that marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost. The optimal output of sector Z is determined by the following 
zero profit condition, where q is price of Z which is determined in the international market 
and t is the amount of import duty. 
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The market clearing condition for skilled labour, which is assumed to be in fixed 
supply ( sL ), is as follows: 
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 The first and the second terms on the left-hand side of equation (4), respectively, are the 
demand for skilled labour in the services and exportable good sector.  
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 The market clearing condition for unskilled labour, which is assumed to be in fixed 
supply ( uL ) is as follows, where the left hand side is the demand for unskilled labour in the 
sector Z. 
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The market clearing condition for capital, which is assumed to be in fixed supply ( K ) 
is as follows, where the left-hand side of equation (6) is demand for capital. 
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 The first, the second and the third terms on the left hand side of equation (6) 
respectively are demand for capital in the services sector ( ),xnK  sector Z ( and the 
exportable good sector ( )  
)zK
.yK
The market clearing condition for the output of the services sector is as follows, 
where the left-hand side of equation (7) is the demand for producer services and the right 
hand side is the aggregate supply. 
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This completes the description of the shortrun equilibrium where equations (1) to (7) 
are seven equations in seven endogenous variables; Y, Z, x, , ws, wu, and r p .  t, q , n, K , sL  
and uL  are exogenous variables. In other words, a number of factors such as the tariff rates 
and the number of firms in the industry can affect skilled and unskilled wage and hence the 
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the shortrun. Following the existing 
literature, the wage gap is measured by skilled-unskilled wage ratio.  
 Within the context of the shortrun equilibrium, the impact of an increase in 
competition in the domestic market can be examined in two ways: (a) an exogenous increase 
in the number of firms in the services sector and (b) an exogenous decrease in services 
sector’s fixed cost. The impact of trade liberalisation can be examined by means of a decrease 
in the amount of import duty on the importable good Z. It is clear that an increase in the level 
of competition and trade liberalisation can affect the skilled and unskilled wage rate and 
hence the wage gap in the shortrun. For example, by making use of equations (1) to (7), the 
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impact of an increase in the competition (i.e., an increase in the number of firms) on wage 
inequality can be examined by equation (9) as follows, where a circumflex is used to denote 
proportional changes. 
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The above equation shows that an increase in competition leads to an unambiguous 
increase in wage inequality as long as (1 )θ β α≥ − . (1 )β α− andθ respectively are exportable 
and importable good sectors. An increase in the number of firms in the services sector 
increases the demand for capital which leads to an increase in the price of capital and owing 
to the substitution effect the unskilled wage rate falls. The overall impact on skilled wage rate 
consists of two effects: a negative effect due to increase in the price of capital and a positive 
effect due to the presence of external economies in exportable good sector. The overall effect 
on skilled wage rate is ambiguous but wage inequality rises as long as the negative effect on 
skilled wage rate is smaller than or equal to the negative effect on unskilled wage rate. The 
impact of a decrease in the fixed cost (which can also be attributed to increased competition) 
in the services sector on wage inequality can be examined by means of equation (10) as 
follows:  
 [ ] [ ][ ]
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Equation (10) shows that a decrease in services sector’s fixed cost increases 
(decreases) wages inequality as long as the income share of capital in the sector Z is larger 
(smaller) than the income share of capital in exportable good sector. This follows from the 
fact that a decrease in the fixed cost releases capital which leads to a decrease in the price of 
capital results in an unambiguous increase in both skilled and unskilled wages. The impact of 
a decrease in import duty on the imported good on wage inequality can be examined by 
means of equation (11) as follows: 
 [ ] [ ]
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Equation (11) shows that a decrease in the amount of import duty on the importable 
good increases wage inequality in the shortrun. This result follows from Stolper-Samuelson 
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theorem which shows that a decrease in the price of a good decreases the reward of the factor 
that is used intensively in its production. 
Based on the analysis of the theoretical model presented in this section, it is clear that 
trade liberalisation and increased competition affect the skilled-unskilled wage gap. However, 
whether or not increased competition for example would increase or decrease the wage gap 
depends on assumptions regarding relative factor intensities.6 Since the theoretical analysis 
produces mixed results (i.e., results that depend on assumptions which may be hard to 
validate in practice), it makes sense to conduct empirical analysis using data from real 
economies. 
3. Econometric Specification and the Data 
Based on the theoretical model presented in section 2, it can be argued that skilled-
unskilled wage gap depends on the level of market competition and the degree of trade 
liberalisation. Of course, other factors also affect skilled-unskilled wage gap and hence the 
following general relationship can be specified. 
wg = f(herfindahl, eintensity, X)7 
where wg is the wage gap, herfindahl index is a measure of the level of market competition, 
eintensity (i.e., the average export intensity) is a measure of the degree of trade liberalisation 
and X is a vector of control variables. 
 The vector of control variables includes other important factors including firm 
characteristics that can also affect the skilled-unskilled wage gap.8 The firm characteristics 
include the size, labour productivity, age, capital intensity, state versus private ownership and 
domestic versus foreign invested firms, and geographical location.9 Based on the general 
specification, we specify the following econometric relationship, where industry and year 
dummies have been added as additional control variables. 
                                                 
6 It is perhaps worth mentioning that the theoretical model is used here mainly to justify the empirical model. 
The theoretical model can also be used to examine the impact of foreign investment on skilled-unskilled wage 
gap. An increase in the stock of capital can be attributed to foreign investment which affects the wage gap 
through its impact on productivity of skilled and unskilled workers (see Anwar, 2010 and Anwar and Rice, 
2009). 
 
7 Later we use a log-linear functional form. The log-linear functional form has been widely used in similar 
studies, for example Hering and Poncet (2010). 
8 Note that later in this section, we closely examine the distribution of the average wage and find that it varies 
significantly across firm characteristics that are included in the vector of control variables. 
 
9 The empirical work of Hering and Poncet (2010) suggests that economic geography can also affect wages. 
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ln(wg) = β0 + β1herfindahl + β2eintensity + β3X+ β4dindustry + 
                                                                   β5dyear + ε                                                       (12) 
where dindustry is a vector of two-digit industry classification dummies to control for the 
industry fixed effect; dyear is a vector of year dummies to control for the time variant 
effect;10 and itε  is the error term which is assumed to be i.i.d. normal. 
Measurement of the Wage Gap 
In order to measure the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled workers, we 
compute the mean of average wage (total wage bill divided by the number of employees) 
within the four-digit industry classification and then divide it by the minimum of this mean 
within the same industry classification as follows: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
=
employeesofnumber
salarytotalmean
employeesofnumber
salarytotalmean
gapwage
min
 
The minimum of the mean of firm average wage bill within the 4-digit industry 
classification is assumed to be the wage that is paid to unskilled workers and hence the ratio 
measures the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled workers.11 
Measurement of Market Competition 
We use Herfindahl index as a measure of the level of market competition, which is a 
common practice in the empirical literature. The Herfindahl index is the sum of squared 
market share of firms, which ranges between 0 and 1 and a higher value indicates a less 
competitive market. Herfindahl index is calculated within the 4-digit industry classification. 
Measurement of Trade Liberalisation 
The level of trade liberalisation is measured by the mean of the firm export intensity 
within the 4-digit industry classification. It is well known that trade liberalisation tends to 
increase the average export intensity.  
Measurement of the Control Variables 
These factors include firm characteristics. The firm size is measured by the number of 
employees. On the one hand, large firms are likely to hire a larger proportion of skilled 
                                                 
10 The year dummies also capture the impact of a change in the minimum wage policy in 2005. 
 
11 It can be argued that the skilled and unskilled workers can be distinguished based on their level of education. 
However, data on worker education are not available.  
 
This is the Submittted Version of a paper published in the journal Economic Modelling: Anwar, S. and Sun, S. (2012) Trade 
liberalisation, market competition and wage inequality in China's manufacturing sector. Economic Modelling, 29 (4). pp.  
1268-1277. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2012.03.013
worker and they can also afford to pay higher wages, which can contribute to an increase in 
the wage gap. On the other hand, large firms tend to have more power in the wage bargaining 
process. Using this market power, large firms can also restrict skilled wage increases, which 
can potentially reduce the skilled-unskilled wage gap. 
The theoretical literature shows that the wage gap is affected by the productivity of 
workers. A firm where workers are relatively more productive is likely to pay higher average 
wage, which increases the wage gap. As far as the impact of firm age is concerned, younger 
firms are more likely to pay lower wages due to their relatively weak financial position, 
which can potentially reduce the wage gap. Some older firms might also pay lower wages due 
to their good reputation (they offer well sought after jobs with actual or perceived job 
security) and hence the overall impact of age on the wage gap can be negative. The impact of 
capital intensity on wage gap is expected to be positive, as the marginal productivity of 
workers employed by relatively capital intensive firms is likely to be higher. The 
geographical location of firms can also affect the wage gap, as suggested by Hering and 
Poncet (2010). Eastern China is more developed than Western and Central China, and 
therefore firms located in Eastern China are more likely to pay higher wages as compared to 
firms located in Central and Western China, which increases the wage gap. 
A firm’s ownership structure also affects the wage gap. The state and collectively 
owned firms in China tend to be relatively less productive. These firms receive some 
financial assistance from the government to survive (Zheng et al., 2003; Zhang et al., 2002) 
and hence such firms are less likely to pay higher wages, which tends to reduce the wage gap. 
On the other hand, some state and collectively owned firms may have monopoly power in the 
goods market, which enables them to pay higher wages. Therefore it is also possible that firm 
ownership status positively affects the wage gap. Whether or not a firm has received foreign 
direct investment (FDI) can also affect the wage gap. An FDI invested firm is likely to expect 
more from their employees. Such firms, for example may require their employees to be able 
to speak a foreign language and hence the average wage paid to skilled workers is likely to be 
higher, which is likely to increase the wage gap.  
Description of the Data Set 
This paper utilises firm level data on Chinese firms in 2000, 2003, and 2006. The 
firms included in the dataset account for more than 85 per cent of China’s total industrial 
output. Existing studies such as Jefferson et al. (2008) and Sun (2009) have utilised the same 
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data set but these studies do not consider the issue of skilled-unskilled wage gap. We follow 
Jefferson et al. (2008) to clean the dataset, namely the following firms are excluded from the 
sample: firms that (i) employed less than eight workers as they may not have reliable 
accounting systems; (ii) reported negative net values of fixed assets and working capital, and 
non-positive output, wage, and value-added; (iii) were located in the upper and lower tail of 
labour productivity distribution12. 
In relation to (iii), we computed VA/L, L/VA, VA/K, K/VA; where VA, L and K 
respectively are the firms value-added, number of employees and net value of fixed assets. 
Firms that sit more than four standard deviations away from their means were not included in 
our sample. All industry level variables (for example the Herfindahl index) were calculated 
after dataset was cleaned. A balanced panel data set was extracted from the original dataset, 
which helps to avoid the impact of panel attrition (e.g., the entry and exit of firms can also 
influence the wage gap). The panel dataset we extracted covers 37,391 firms in 2000, 2003, 
and 2006. 
There has been a change in the minimum wage legislation in China in 2004. In 2003, 
the Chinese firms were operating under the previous minimum wage legislation The impact 
of a change in the minimum wage legislation is captured by the year dummies. In addition, 
the legislation stipulates that the minimum wage must take into account factors such as the 
urban residents’ average living expenses and region’s unemployment rate. Accordingly, the 
minimum wage in China varies from region to region. The geographical location dummies 
capture this effect.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the cleaned dataset. Information presented 
in Table 1 suggests that all variables take reasonable values and there exists significant 
variation within the variables. For example, consider the firm size - on the average a firm 
employs 480 workers and the corresponding standard deviation is 1,770, which is more than 
three times that of the mean; the largest firm employs over 161 thousand workers while in 
contrast the smallest firm employs only 8 workers.  Since the ownership structure, 
geographical location, and whether or not a firm is foreign invested are dummy variables, we 
only report the average values that merely indicates the percentage of firms that were 
assigned a value of 1. Hence, 57 per cent of the firms included in our empirical analysis are 
privately owned and 31 per cent of the firms are foreign invested. The average value of the 
                                                 
12 Note that excluding these firms avoids the undesirable impacts of outliers in the data. 
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Herfindahl index is as low as 0.02 indicating that some industries are highly competitive. It is 
interesting to note that the agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery-specific 
instrument manufacturing industry (4124) consisted of only one firm in 2003. The export 
activities are quite significant with an average of 0.16 (indicating that on average, firms 
export 17 per cent of their total sales) and a maximum of 0.86. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables     Sample Size Mean 
     
Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln(wage gap) 112173 0.98 0.66 0 3.93 
firm size 112173 0.48 1.77 0.008 161.65 
labour productivity 112173 82.24 127.39 0.11 3232.76
firm age 112173 15.51 13.31 1 407 
capital intensity 112173 83.62 158.48 0.01 12681 
Herfindahl index 112173 0.02 0.04 0.00 1 
average export 
intensity 112173 0.17 0.17 0 0.86 
ownership 112173 0.53    
whetherfdi 112173 0.32    
western 112173 0.10    
middle 112173 0.12    
Note: ownership is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is privately owned; 
whetherfdi is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is foreign invested. Two firms 
that produce traditional Chinese medicine reported a history dated back to the 15th century, 
which makes their age over 400 years. 
 
Distribution of the Average Wage 
Before we present the empirical results, we first discuss the distribution of average 
wage and explore its relationship with firm characteristics. This will help us to further justify 
the inclusion of firm characteristics as control variables in our empirical model. The main 
characteristics of the wage distribution are summarised in Table 2, which shows considerable 
variation in the average wage across firms. The average wage per employee is 13.23 thousand 
RMB with a standard deviation of 11.27 thousand. The highest average wage per employee is 
478.11 thousand RMB and in contrast the lowest average wage per employee is 0.01 
thousand RMB. The firms that pay a very low average wage (i.e., an average wage of less 
than 1 thousand RMB) account for a very small proportion of the total firms. In 2000, 2003 
and 2006 respectively there were 379, 204 and 4 such firms. These firms respectively account 
for 1 per cent, 0.5 per cent and 0.01 per cent of the total firms. While the mean of the average 
wage bill has increased over time, the standard deviation, which is a measure of dispersion, 
has also increased. 
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 Table 2: Distribution of the Average Wage 
Year Sample Size Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
All 112173 13.23 11.27 0.01 478.11 
2000 37931 10.68 9.48 0.01 344.50 
2003 37931 13.09 10.76 0.07 478.11 
2006 37931 15.93 12.73 0.35 178.35 
Note: the average wage is deflated to 2000 prices; Unit: thousand RMB/ 
employee. 
 
Will the distribution of average wage be affected by firm characteristics, such as the 
firm size, labour productivity, age, capital intensity, ownership structure, and whether or not a 
firm is foreign invested? To answer this question, we examine the differences in the 
distribution of the average wage across firm characteristics. Since the firm size, labour 
productivity, age, and capital intensity are continuous variables, we first define four dummy 
variables that take a value of 1, if a firm is (i) big (i.e., its size is bigger than the mean firm 
size), (ii) productive (i.e., its labour productivity is higher than the average labour 
productivity), (iii) old (i.e., its age is bigger than the mean of firm age) and (iv) capital 
intensive (i.e., its capital intensity is higher than the average capital intensity). We then 
consider whether or not the distribution of the average wage varies significantly across these 
six variables. For example, we consider whether or not the distribution of average wage for 
foreign invested firms is significantly different from that of the firms that have not attracted 
any foreign investment (i.e., the firms that are purely domestic owned and operated).  
The figure presented in Appendix 1 shows the distribution of the average wage by 
firm size. It appears that as compared to the small firms, the average wage distribution of the 
large firms is biased more to the right, indicating that on average large firms do pay higher 
wages. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Kolmogorov, 1933, and Smirnov, 1933) for equality 
of two distributions also rejects the null hypothesis of equal distribution with a test statistic of 
0.0774and a p-value of 0.000. Similar patterns can also be observed from figures presented in 
Appendix 2-6. The average wage distributions of the productive, old, capital intensive, 
privately owned and foreign invested firms are biased to the right as compared to less 
productive, young, less capital intensive, state and collectively owned, and domestic firms 
respectively. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is also used to test the equality of all of these 
distributions. Based on the results of this test, we were able to reject the null hypothesis of 
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equality. In summary, we observe that a significant variation exists in the average wage 
across the selected firm characteristics, which justifies the inclusion of these characteristics as 
control variables in our econometric model. 
4. Empirical Results 
In Equation (12), we have included a set of control variables that conceptually affect 
the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labour. Nevertheless to what extent does this 
specification fit the population from which the data were sampled? Based on Equation (12), 
we use a number of information criteria to search for the best specification. We utilize a 
variable selection procedure provided by Lindsey and Sheather (2010), where a leaps-and-
bounds algorithm is used. The leaps-and-bounds algorithm identifies the optimal model as the 
one with the smallest value of Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Akaike’s corrected 
information criterion (AICC), and Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the one with the 
largest adjusted R2, and the one with a Mallows’s Cp being the smallest or being close to the 
number of variables in the models plus 1. Our search process finds that the full specification 
(namely Equation 12) is the optimal model with an adjust R2, Mallows’s Cp, AIC, AICC, and 
BIC being 0.9237, 45, -206931.4, 429371.8, and -206466.9 respectively. Thus in our later 
empirical exercises, we use the specification of Equation (12). 
Labour productivity and the wage rate are positively related. For a given labour force, 
as the firms become more capital intensive, productivity of labour increases (since marginal 
product of capital is non-negative). Therefore, labour productivity variable may be 
endogenous, since we are simultaneously using capital intensity as a determinant skilled-
unskilled wage gap. In other words, it can be argued that labour productivity, which appears 
as one of the independent variables in our econometric model, is an endogenous variable. 
Nevertheless, in our empirical exercise, we first assume that labour productivity is exogenous 
and then account for possible endogeneity by making use of an instrumental variable (IV) 
estimator. Before estimating the econometric model, we first check for the presence of 
outliers in our sample. Based on the results of Grubbs test (Grubbs, 1969 and Stefansky, 
1972), we conclude that outliers are not present in our dataset. Using Wooldridge test 
(Wooldrige, 2002), we test whether or not the error terms are serially correlated. The 
Wooldridge test is also robust to conditional heteroskedasticity. Drukker (2003) has shown 
that for a reasonable sample size, this test has good size and power properties. Our sample 
consists of 112,173 observations and hence the Wooldridge test is applicable in our context. 
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The estimated value of the test is 3138.422 with a p-value of 0.000. Thus we reject the null 
hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation at less than 1 per cent significance level. Since the 
mean average wage differs substantially across the four-digit industry classification within 
the manufacturing sector, it is reasonable to suspect that dependent variable in our 
econometric model is heteroskedastic. Thus we conduct a modified Wald test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity. The estimated test statistic of   with a p-value of 0.000 allows us 
to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at less than 1 per cent level of significance. 
Since there is evidence of significant autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, we correct for 
these problems by calculating the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors. Specifically, we utilise the procedure suggested by Schaffer (2007).  
32102×
To address the endogeneity problem identified in the above, we employ the 
instrumental variable (IV) estimator, using the one-period lagged labour productivity as the 
instrument.13 The IV estimation is carried out using Schaffer (2007) procedure. As we find 
evidence of significant heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation when labour productivity is 
assumed to be exogenous, we suspect that IV estimation will also be affected by 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Accordingly, the IV estimation is based on 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. We conduct a feasible efficient 
two-step generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation, which is more efficient than the 
two-step least square (2SLS) IV estimation when significant heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation are present (Baum et al. 2007). While using IV/GMM estimation technique, 
we first test for the relevance of the selected instruments – i.e., we closely examine the fit of 
the first stage regression. In the first stage regression, Bound et al. (1995) partial R-square 
and the Shea (1997) partial R-square are both 0.29, and the F-statistic for the significance of 
the lagged labour productivity is 17672.41with a p-value of 0.000, which suggests that the 
instrument is relevant. The last step involves the choice of estimation technique - the 
IV/GMM estimation versus the estimation technique that assumes that labour productivity is 
exogenous. In order to make an informed choice, we carry out an endogeneity test based on 
the C-statistic (see Eichenbaum et al., 1988 and Hayashi, 2000). The estimated value of the 
C-statistic can be used to test for orthogonality of the endogenous variables. In the present 
case, the estimated value of the C-statistic is 323.87with a corresponding p-value of 0.000, 
                                                 
13 It has been argued that lagged variables do not always serve as good instruments and the estimated 
results may be sensitive to the choice of instruments. Accordingly, one should try to use other suitable 
instrumental variables. Unfortunately, lack of data prevented us from using other instrumental variables. Recent 
studies such as Barbosa and Eiriz (2009) and Suyanto et al. (2009) have also highlighted this problem but 
following other studies involving developing economies, they have also used lagged variables as instruments. 
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which allows us to reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality of labour productivity at a very 
low level of significance. Accordingly, it is possible to argue that IV/GMM estimation results 
are more reliable. The empirical results are presented in Table 3. 
Column (1) of Table 3 contains the estimated coefficients and standard errors when 
labour productivity is treated as an exogenous variable, whereas column (2) contains the 
estimated results when one period lag of the labour productivity is used as an instrument. 
However, by making use of the C-statisitc, we have already determined that the estimated 
resulted presented in column (2) are more reliable. The discussion that follows is based on the 
estimated results presented in column (2). 
 
Table 3: Estimation Results 
  (1) (2) 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient
Standard 
Error      
P 
value 
Estimated 
Coefficient
Standard 
Error       
P 
value 
ln(firm size) -0.0043 0.0006 0.00 -0.0021 0.0006 0.00 
ln(labour productivity) 0.0177 0.0007 0.00 0.0321 0.0013 0.00 
firm age -0.0004 0.0000 0.00 0.00001 0.0001 0.84 
ln(capital intensity) 0.0064 0.0005 0.00 0.00004 0.0007 0.95 
ownership -0.0024 0.0014 0.07 -0.0076 0.0014 0.00 
whether FDI invested 0.0311 0.0015 0.00 0.0273 0.0014 0.00 
western -0.0272 0.0022 0.00 -0.0241 0.0024 0.00 
middle -0.0286 0.0019 0.00 -0.0270 0.0021 0.00 
Herfindahl index 0.7789 0.0296 0.00 0.8005 0.0359 0.00 
average export 
intensity (4-digit  
industry classification) 0.0956 0.0051 0.00 0.0486 0.0055 0.00 
constant 1.5194 0.0045 0.00 0.0977 0.0058 0.00 
 
industry dummies yes  yes  
year dummies yes  yes  
Number of 
observations 112125  74781  
F-value 42335.57  2664.66  
Centered R2 0.93  0.59  
Note: (i) Column (1) is the pooled OLS estimation without the instrument whereas column (2) is the 
IV/GMM fixed effect estimation with the one year lagged labour productivity as the instrument; (ii) Both 
estimations employ the feasible efficient two-step GMM estimator; (iii) The standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust; (iv) A 2SLS IV estimation produces results that are similar to 
the results presented in column (2); (v) the impact of minimum wage policy is captured by the year dummies. 
 
The two variables of interest are the Herfindahl index, which captures the extent of 
market competition, and the average export intensity, which captures the level of trade 
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liberalisation. The coefficient of the Herfindahl index is 0.8 with a standard error of 0.03, 
indicating that a 1 unit increase in Herfindahl index results in 0.8 per cent increase in skilled-
unskilled wage gap in China’s manufacturing sector. An increase in Herfindahl index reflects 
a decrease in market competition. Hence increase in market competition appears to reduce the 
wage gap. In a competitive goods market, high level of competition forces firms to employ 
more skilled workers as skilled workers are relatively more productive. In a competitive 
labour market, workers are paid based on their value of marginal productivity. However, due 
to the law of diminishing marginal returns, as more skilled workers are utilised, the marginal 
productivity declines, which results in a decrease in the wage gap. The estimated coefficient 
of the average export intensity as reported in Table 2 is positive and significant. It can 
therefore be argued that a one unit increase in the average export intensity (i.e., trade 
liberalisation) leads to 0.05 per cent increase in the wage gap.  
Most firm characteristics included in our econometric model appear to have 
significant impact on the wage gap. The firm size, as measured by the number of employees, 
exerts a significantly negative impact - a 1 per cent increase in the firm size leads to a 0.0021 
per cent decrease in the wage gap, which is surprising but it can occur if large firms are able 
to exert strong pressure during wage bargaining process. The labour productivity has a 
significant and positive impact on the wage gap, which is not surprising as firms with higher 
labour productivity tend to pay a higher average wage. The impact of capital intensity is 
found to be insignificant. This can be attributed to the fact that although firms with higher 
capital intensity tend to have more productive workers, which in turn leads to higher wages 
thereby increasing the wage gap, we have already controlled for the impact of labour 
productivity. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the impact of capital intensity on the wage 
gap in our empirical model is insignificant.  
The results presented in Table 2 suggest that firm ownership structure also has a 
significant impact on the wage gap. Being state and collectively owned positively contributes 
to the wage gap, which suggests that an increase in the proportion of private firms in China is 
likely to have a negative impact on the wage gap. Whether or not a firm is FDI invested has a 
significant and positive impact on the wage gap as the foreign firms tend to pay higher 
wages. Firm age is found to exert an insignificant impact on the wage gap, which is 
consistent with our expectations. Younger firms might pay lower wages due to their relatively 
weak financial position, which is likely to have a negative effect on the wage gap. Some older 
firms might also pay lower wages as they attract many good workers and offer relatively 
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secure jobs with additional benefits. But many older firms and almost all foreign invested 
firms pay higher wage, which increases the wage gap. Accordingly, the overall impact of 
firm age on the wage gap can be insignificant as the positive and negative effects may cancel 
each other. The coefficients of western and middle are significantly negative, which confirms 
that firms in Western and Central China pay lower wages than their Coastal counterparts. 
In order to test for the robustness of our empirical results, the econometric model was 
also estimated without the firm characteristics (i.e., only Herfindahl index, industry export 
intensity, and industry and year dummies were included as independent variables). The 
estimated equation is: ln(wg) = 1.6135 + 0.7904herfindahl + 0.1115industry_eintensity. The 
estimated coefficients were found to be significant at the 1 per cent level and the coefficients 
of industry and year dummies are not reported here. Although, the size of the estimated 
coefficients has changed, the signs are unaffected. In other words, our main results 
concerning the impact of market competition and trade liberalisation on the wage gap remain 
unaffected.  
Note that we measured the wage gap as the mean of average wage within the four-
digit industry classification divided by the minimum of this mean within the same industry 
classification. We also measured trade liberalisation as the mean of the firm export intensity 
within the 4-digit industry classification. However, since the mean is sensitive to the 
existence of outliers, we re-constructed the trade liberalisation variable as the median of firm 
export intensity within the 4-digit industries. We also re-estimated, the wage gap as follows:  
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
=
employeesofnumber
salarytotalmedian
employeesofnumber
salarytotalmedian
gapwage
min
 
 
By making use of the new values of trade liberalisation and the skilled-unskilled wage 
gap, the econometric model was re-estimated. The estimated model is as follows:  
ln(wg) = 0.1042 + 0.0229ln(labour productivity) - 0.0002ln(firm size) –  
 0.00005age + 0.0004ln(capital intensity) - 0.0044ownership +  
0.0239whetherfdi - 0.0245wetern - 0.0313middle + 
0.6026herfindahl + 0.0685eintensity 
 
where whetherfdi is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is FDI invested; 
western and middle are two dummies that take a value of 1 if a firm is located in Western and 
Central China respectively. 
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The estimated coefficients of the firm size, age, and capital intensity are not 
significant at the 5 per cent level (the coefficients of industry and year dummies are not 
reported). Again we observe some variation in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of 
Herfindahl index and trade liberalisation. However, there is no change in any of the signs. It 
can therefore be argued that the results presented in this paper are robust to the different 
measures of wage gap and trade liberalisation. 
5. Conclusions 
Since the introduction of market oriented reforms in the late 1980s, the Chinese 
economy has consistently registered strong economic growth. While the overall standard of 
living as measured by real per-capita income has improved, the benefits of economic growth 
are not equally shared by all. There is strong evidence of rising income inequality in China. A 
number of studies have considered the issue of income inequality in different regions of 
China. It has been argued that rising income inequality is a concern because it can increase 
social tensions that can stifle economic growth. 
This paper attempts to extend the existing literature by focusing on the determinants 
of the skilled-unskilled wage gap in China’s manufacturing sector. We use a theoretical 
model to argue that trade liberalisation and market competition can affect skilled-unskilled 
wage gap. Based on this result, an econometric model is specified. The econometric model is 
estimated by making use of firm level data for 2000, 2003 and 2006. The empirical analysis 
suggests that trade liberalisation has contributed to an increase in skilled-unskilled wage gap 
in China and increased market competition has contributed to a decrease in the wage gap. Our 
empirical analysis also suggests that the impact of firm characteristics on wage gap in China 
is significant. For example the labour productivity positively affects the wage gap and an 
increase in foreign invested firms is contributing to rising wage gap. We also found that an 
increase in the number of private firms (i.e., a decrease in state owned or collectively owned 
firms) is likely to reduce the skilled-unskilled wage gap. 
Given the worldwide push for further trade liberalisation, it is not in China’s overall 
economic interest to reverse or even slowdown the pace of trade liberalisation. However, the 
Chinese government can take steps that are likely to increase market competition thereby 
slowing down the rate of increase in skilled-unskilled wage gap. As a result of rapid 
economic growth, the Chinese government is facing additional internal as well as external 
challenges. Internal challenges include uneven regional economic development and rising 
income inequality, while the rising trade surplus with the US and the European Union is 
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contributing to external pressures in the form of demands for revaluation of the Chinese 
currency. In order to ensure a minimum standard of living for all workers, the minimum wage 
in China is regularly adjusted upwards. By increasing investment in education and training, 
the Chinese government can help reduce the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled 
workers. Careful government planning and increased spending on infrastructure in relatively 
less developed regions can also help reduce regional income disparity. Increased integration 
with the world economy has several benefits such as increased foreign investment. However, 
the size of direct as well as indirect benefits of foreign investment crucially depends on the 
availability of appropriate production infrastructure and human capital in the form of highly 
skilled workers. The rising standard of living in China is encouraging an increased number of 
Chinese parents to send their children for education in foreign countries which is likely to 
contribute to the problem of brain drain - an area of research that has not been explored so 
far.    
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Appendix 2: Distribution of the Average Wage by Labour Productivity 
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Appendix 3: Distribution of the Average Wage by Firm Age 
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Appendix 4: Distribution of the Average Wage by Capital Intensity 
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